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Introduction  
The Decisions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 molded a new map of the Balkans, where 
the insurgencies, revolts and discontent of the natives and Ottoman authorities were con-
stant. Between attrition and expansion, Austria-Hungary thought to pursue a policy of 
“peaceful penetration”, where a possible exit to Thessaloniki would had secured the long-
sought dream of a gateway in the riches of the Orient. In this prospect after the oppression 
of the Albanian League of Prizren in 1878, the diplomatic missions of Danubian Monarchy 
started to show more interest to the Albanian political element. 
The diplomats in the Ballhausplatz foresaw a possible collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and this prediction became a sour reality during the Crete Crisis and the Greek-Ottoman 
War in 1896/1897. At the same time the uncertainties grew from the possible cooperation 
of the Serbian-Montenegrin forces along with the Italians in the Western Balkans. In order 
to remedy this situation and to put the entire Albanian policy of the Monarchy on a broader 
and more successful basis, were organized three secr t conferences (political readings). The 
possible triggers for these confidential discussion were the current Crete crisis in 1896 and 
two memorandums from two prominent southern Albanian Muslim notables, Ferit Bey 
Vlora (ex-Grand Vizier of the Sublime Porte) and his brother Syrja Bey Vlora addressed to 
Ballhausplatz in the same year, through the mediation of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador 
in Constantinople Heinrich von Calice. If the Viennse “Albanian Action” would had been 
successful, the Monarchy would had established a protectorate over the Albanian territories 
while maintaining Ottoman sovereignty and driven a wedge between Montenegro and Ser-
bia by means of the western Sandshak of Novipazar. 
Two decades later in 1916, the situation in the peninsula had changed drastically, where 
the “peaceful penetration” policy had surrendered to the force of arms. Two Balkan Wars, 
the decisions of the London Treaty and the entry into the Great War after the assassination 
of the Thronfolger in Sarajevo, had reframed the geopolitical objectivs and interests of the 
Monarchy in the area. Albania had won the independence after many deliberations and bar-
gains over her borders, later to fall into a civil war in 1914-1916. Austria-Hungary in the 
same prospect had struggled in a war in three different fronts: Italy, Russia and the Balkans. 
After three Austro-Hungarian offensives, the end of 1915 brought greater military and dip-
lomatic success for the Central Powers, with the entry of Bulgaria in the war on 14th of Oc-




Following these military victories, in early 1916 it was organized the meeting of Coun-
cils of Ministers for the Commons Affairs (GMR). Inthis meeting the joint Ministers made 
a number of adjustments to the War Aims initially proposed on the GMR of 19th of June 
1914, and subsequentially dealt with a number of issue , such as the legal base and admini-
stration method of the new conquered areas. The main debated topics were those related 
with the Austro-Hungarian imperial policies over Poland and Serbia. Leading to the ques-
tion of how to deal with the Slavic population of the newly acquired territories, it was 
brought up the Albanian problem and a possible reshaping of her territories and status as an 
independent state. 
Secret Conferences of 1896 
Between 17th of November and 23rd of December 1896, were organized three secret confer-
ences in the Ballhausplatz in Vienna, the outcome of which was a Memorandum and a new 
position regarding the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe. Under the 
title “Eine energische Aktion” the secret sessions lead by the Joint Foreign Minister, Count 
Agenor Gołuchowski, proposed the creation of an independent Principality of Albania.1 
Following the tradition of the Ministerium des Äußern (MdÄ), the conferences were held 
secretly, especially due to the sensitive nature of the policies discussed. The other institu-
tional bodies, such as the respective parliaments and governments, were informed in a later 
date via formal acts on the position of the Ministry and its organs. 
The following actors took part in the conference: Joint Foreign Minister Agenor Gołu-
chowski, the Joint Finance Minister Benjámin Kállay, the ex-minister and extraordinary 
ambassador Erich Zwiedineck, the Head of Section for the Orient in MdÄ Eduard 
Horowitz, the General Consul Norbert Schmucker, and the Consul Constantin Baum acting 
as secretary for the three conferences. Beside the participants, in the second and third con-
ference took part also von Fuchs as diplomat and adviser for the K.u.K court. 
1st Secret meeting (17th of November 1896) 
The first speaker of this secret session was the Joint F reign Minister Gołuchowski. He ini-
tially made a statement on the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary toward the Balkan areas. 
After the decisions of the Congress of Berlin and a number of incidents in the region, it was 
projected that the Ottoman rule over Rumeli could not be sustained for long. In case the ter-
ritories would be dismantled from competing Great Powers, an analysis of the interests of 
the Danube Monarchy had to be assessed. Of great rel vance was the position of the Alba-
nian Catholic populations of the north and the Muslim ones in the south, and in the opinion 
of Gołuchowski, these Albanian speaking territories should be independent in the form of a 
principality under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary.2 
                                                
1 HHStA, PA I, k. 473. See also the wonderful book of T.Toleva Der Einfluss Österreich-Ungarns 
auf die Bildung der albanischen Nation 1896‒1908, and the analyzes done by the book of K. 
Gostentschnigg, Wissenschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Militär, 347‒357. 
2 Ibid. k. 473. 
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In the opinion of the minister, Vienna should not be unprepared if the rule of the Otto-
man authorities in the area cease to exist. The interes  of the rivaling powers (Russian Em-
pire and Italy) and the Balkan countries were known, and the power vacuum would soon be 
filled if the Monarchy would not act in advance. For this reason, the speaker advocated for 
further preparation in the diplomatic corpus in thear a of interest. Additionally, it was pro-
posed to test a possible cooperation with Greece. Her interests were well-known in the 
southern vilayet of Ioannina up to the Shkumbini River in central Albania. According to 
Gołuchowski, securing a possible agreement with the Gr ek counterpart could pose a bar-
rier for the expanding influence and interest of Italy. 
The second speaker of the conference was Joint Minister of Finance Kállay. In his open-
ing statement he agreed with Gołuchowski on the geopolitical necessity of the Monarchy in 
having an independent Albania. But he underlined a number of difficulties for the realiza-
tion of Albanian project. The main issues were related with the internal divisions between 
the Albanians (regional, linguistic and religious), the lack of a historical Albanian state in 
the past and the absence of a middle class, from where t e social and political life was not 
subjected to small local personal interests.3 
The action, on the other side was facilitated by a number of positive elements. The most 
important one was the rising belief among the Albanians that they could not endure as a na-
tion without the “help of a Great Power”.4 On the long run, with a proper strategy of action, 
the majority of Muslim Albanians, would understand, and accept that salvation for their 
current geopolitical situation would not come from Constantinople, but from the creation of 
an independent principality. The minister and other pa ticipants, held the view that the 
Catholics of the north wouldn’t had any objections, since historically they had found sup-
port via the Kultusprotektorat of the Monarchy. 
Kállay proposed a number of additional measures. He advised that initially the action 
had to be implemented in the Catholic areas, gradually and simultaneously to be introduced 
later on into the Muslim ones. It was pivotal that the measures shouldn’t be seen by the 
Muslim community as an imperial Catholic action. The smuggling of weapons and ammu-
nition had to continue, especially in the Kosovo and Shkoder vilayets, and by doing so, dis-
rupting a possible cooperation of the mountainous tribes with the Montenegrin authorities 
against the Monarchy. Beside the weapon and propagand  support, a third pillar would had 
                                                
3 HHStA, PA I, k. 473, Fol.100. 
4 In 1896 the Albanian nobleman Surya (alb. Syrja) Bey Vlora, the brother of the previous Ottoman 
Grand vizier Ferit Bey, wrote a Memorandum addressed to the Ministerium des Äußern. In his memo, 
Surya Bey posed the view that the rule of the Ottomans would fall soon in the Balkans and the Alba-
nians needed to seek the support of a new Great Power t  help them elevate as a nation. A part from 
his memorandum: “We the Albanians, know very well that sooner or later the Turkish rule in Europe 
will end. The Epirotes will be taken by Greece, the Bulgarians as well from Bulgaria and the Serbians 
will go to Serbia or Montenegro. What about us, the Albanians, what it will happen? As I know well 
the soul of my fellow Albanian patriots, we will be favorized if we fall under the protectorate of Aus-
tria-Hungary, through the creation of an autonomous province. Italy has never been popular among 
us, despite the propaganda of some priests and Italian diplomats in Albania. If we as Muslim must be 
integrated under a foreign government, because for the moment we do not possess the necessary ma-
turity to establish an independent Albania, we prefer Austria-Hungary over any other foreign power. 
Even the lowest strata of our people know until what point the Austro-Hungarian government respects 




been the wide financial and material support for the Albanian leaders [done discreetly to the 
Ottoman authorities], who would agree with the course of action proposed by Ballhaus-
platz. 
Regarding the cooperation with Greece for a joint policy toward Albania, Zwiedineck 
argued that the vilayet of Ioannina had to be excluded from the course of action, because 
the Hellenization process was in an advanced phase. Kállay in principle accepted the 
proposition for a cooperation with Greece. But befor  excluding the vilayet of Ioannina 
from the course of action, he wanted to test in reality how strong was the Greek influence in 
the Albanian speaking areas of Epirus. 
2nd secret meeting (8th of December 1896) 
The previous conference was concluded with the assignment of Schmucker and Zwiedineck 
to the task of producing a concrete study in relation with the possibilities, circumstances 
and situation of the discussed areas. After three wks, the two experts produced a report 
titled “Memorandum über Albanien”, which served as the main subject of analyzes of the 
second secret conference. The speaker for it was Zwiedineck and it was comprised into 
three main topics: the action area, the political and national conditions of Albania and fi-
nally the action measures. 
The action area: 
According to Zwiedineck, there was no clear political and geographical territories, where 
the Albanians were localized as political-administrative entity in the Ottoman territories in 
the Balkans. Under this auspice, the imperial authorities had to draw imaginary lines on ar-
eas where the Albanian element among the population was dominant. In this regard, in the 
north, the border passed through Montenegro and Bosnia, and partially in the southern part 
of Serbia, while the Adriatic Sea served as a natural border in the west. In the east, it was 
defined by the line Kostur – Manastir – Ohri – Vrranjë – Prishtinë – Novipazar, while the 
southerner border run along the line Preveza – Ioannin – Gjirokastër – Kostur. 
The total population of the four Albanian vilayets was around 2.5 million inhabitants, 
according to the statistics of the Ballhausplatz. There were used two principles in the re-
cords: nationality and religion, and the Albanians were respectively 43% of the total popu-
lation (around 1.1 million people),5 and none of the other nationalities passed this majority 
in any of the vilayets. 
Zwiedineck continued his report in front of the other representatives by passing to the 
other element of analysis.6 The nation was comprised by two ethno-linguistic groups: 
1) the Gegë, who were concentrated in majority on the Vilayets of Kosovo, Shkodra and 
Manastir, and used the Albanian dialect called Gegërisht. The Gegë were generally viewed 
as stronger physically, braver and with a stronger fe ling of honor and independence. Their 
socio-economic structure was organized around the trib (alb. Fis), and the areas where it 
was located. On top of the tribes stood as judge and military figures, the Council of Elders 
                                                
5 HHStA, PA I, Fol. 170. 
6 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 172 b. 
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or Bayraktar (Turkish for Flag holder), from where were taken the decisions of war and 
peace. Generally, they wrote their language in the Latin transcript among the Christians and 
by using mixed forms of Arabic-Ottoman Turkish transcripts among the Muslims. Among 
them, the main religious groups were the Catholic and the Sunni sect. 
2) the Toskë, who were concentrated in majority in the Vilayet of Ioannina, were nu-
merous after crossing the southern shore of the Shkumbini River and used the Albanian dia-
lect called Toskërisht. Differently from the Gegë, they were characterized by three religious 
groups, two Muslim sects (the Sunni and the Bektashi) and the Christian orthodox sect. 
While the Gegërisht dialect was considered stronger and deeper into pronunciation, the 
Toskërisht dialect was softer and used generally Greek letters among the orthodox Albani-
ans, and Arabic-Ottoman Turkish letters among the Muslims. The Toskë were viewed as 
more prone to foreign influence, and with deep penetration in the power courts in Greece 
and Ottoman Empire. The Beys of the south had more privileges in their respectiv  areas of 
influence. Differently from the tribal lords of the north, there were visible clear distinctions 
on socio-economical terms between poor and rich Muslims. This characteristic made them 
more pragmatic and more dangerous to control. Under this auspice, the Baron proposed that 
the Toskë, would be excluded from the activity of the action plan. 
 
Table 1. Demographic data from the report “Memorandum über Albanien” 
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7 Ibid. Fol. 170. 
8 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 171 and 171 b. 
9 Unclear the disposition of the believers between the two Christian sects. 
10 Ibid. Fol. 171 b. 
11 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 172. 
12 The religious disposition of the Muslim and Orthodox community (Albanians) of Ioannina is un-
clear. The authorities couldn’t distinguish between the Greek Orthodox, the Hellenized Orthodox Al-
banians and the Nationalist Orthodox Albanians, so approximately the Ballhausplatz judged that 1/3 
of the population was Orthodox and the rest Muslim. 
13 Regarding the religion affiliation, it’s was difficult to do an assessment regarding the Albanian 
element, but the authorities calculated that 78-79% were Muslim and 21-22% were Christians, respec-
tively 102000 Catholics and 60000 orthodox. The data between single invoices and total number dif-
fers, showing that the demographic sources Austria-Hungary had, were incomplete and approxima-




According to the analyzes, the two groups were foreign to each other in many elements, 
but there was no sign of hostility among them. No form of compact unity in nationalistic 
terms was evident between the two groups, while no political goal or common interest was 
visible. But, despite the many differences, the twogr ups had an agreement in broader po-
litical lines for an autonomous unified Albanian province.14 The continuous threat per-
ceived generally by the Albanians from the interventions of the Russian Empire in the pen-
insula, had formed even among the loyal Muslim elemnts, the belief that the Austro-
Hungarians would be their natural allies, in order to block “the rising hated slavs”,15 in 
case the Sublime Porte fails to protect them. 
Zwiedineck based on the premises mentioned above, drove three general conclusions: 1) 
the Catholics of the north supported Austria-Hungary, 2) the orthodox of the south were 
oriented toward Greece and 3) the Muslims were loyal subjects to the government. This 
loyalty generally stemmed from two factors: the idea that Turkish rule was the only rule 
where their freedoms and privileges were secured and their social benefits would not be 
taken away; secondly, the religious imposition toward  Christian foreign power.16 
As a final remark of this part of the report, from the reports of the former General con-
sul in Shkodra Lippich17, the main difficulty of communication between the south and the 
north stemmed from the lack of a unified language and lphabet. The absence of this in-
strument had been detrimental toward the political goal of unification by the Dual Monar-
chy, and was accepted as a problem that had to be slv d beforehand.18 
The action measures: 
The first proposed measure was the creation of a propaganda in the Albanian vilayets, that 
Austria-Hungary had no desire for territorial expansio  in the mentioned areas. The goal 
was to promote the idea that the Monarchy was “a upporter and protector of the Albanian 
people in case of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, […]  because [the action] it’s not about the 
invasion of their land by our side, but for defending and helping their endeavor for the 
creation of an autonomous Albania”.19 For this reason, three sets of propositions were pre-
sented in order to raise the influence of Austria-Hungary among the Albanians: a) to the 
Catholic community20, b) toward the Muslim community21, c) for the general public.22 The 
actions toward these three specific social communities were addressed in order to win their 
favorable support, mainly by giving regular payments to influential leaders, gifts, humani-
                                                
14 Ibid. Fol. 172 b. 
15 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 173. 
16 Ibid. Fol. 173 b. 
17 Friedrich Lippich (1834‒1888), served for 15 years (1864‒1879) in the Albanian-speaking vilayets 
as vice-chancellor up to the status of General consul i  Shkodra. His insight was valuable for the offi-
cials to produce the report of the conference. See E. Deusch, Die effektiven Konsuln Österreich(-
Ungarns) von 1825-1918, 432‒433. 
18 HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 174 b. 
19 Ibid. Fol. 175. 
20 Ibid. Fol. 180. 
21 Ibid. Fol. 181. 
22 Ibid. Fol. 180. 
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tarian aids, and a wider and more public interaction of the Austro-Hungarian consuls into 
the areas proposed by the plan. 
Zwiedineck pointed also in his report to test of the actual political conditions among the 
Albanians. This measure was advised in order to prove if the minimal conditions existed, 
for the creation of an Albanian autonomous state, and if there were tools in order to protect it. 
Later on, he analyzed the current situation of the religious Catholic mission in Albania, 
safeguarded by Austria-Hungary under the legal Status of Kultusprotektorat.23 In his ana-
lyzes, the primary interlocutors for the action, especially in the mountainous areas, were the 
Catholic priests. With the religious center in Shkodra, the religious Catholic mission in Al-
bania was organized in the following manner: 1 - the Archbishop seat in Shkodra (with the 
diocese of Pult, Sapa and Alessio); 2 - the Abbey of Saint Alexander (alb. Shën Aleksandri) 
in Mirditë; 3 - the Archdiocese of Durrës; 4 - the Archdiocese of Uskub (alb. Shkup). 
The clerical body was divided among the laic and monastic religious elements, where 
the main ones where the Franciscan and Jesuit orders. They were assisted also by the Stig-
mata Nuns and Charity Sisters in Prizren. The secular elements used to preach in the cities, 
fields and valleys near the urban areas, while the Franciscans were active in the mountain-
ous areas, and rarely were seen in the lower lands. Stationed in Troshan, they were teachers 
for the novices and had a school for boys in Shkodra.24 The Jesuit Order was more active in 
the urban areas, and generally preached in the stret  and rarely in the churches. The Order 
was in charge of the education in the religious seminar and the trade school in Shkodra.25 
After the contextual remarks, Zwiedineck pointed out that the clerical attitude toward 
Austria-Hungary despite the continuous help of the Monarchy, had been disappointing. Es-
pecially among the priests of different orders and different nationalities, the political agenda 
proposed by the Ballhausplatz, had been of second or tertiary relevance. The material and 
personal conflicts over hierarchical religious positi ns and benefits had stopped the creation 
of a unified national political view and its implemntation among the northern Catholic 
tribesmen. The Albanian religious figures such as Don Primus Docci (alb. Preng Doçi) 
were constantly viewed as ambitious and dangerous personalities.26 In this regards Zwiedi-
neck viewed that the economical sacrifices done by the Danube Monarchy were in dispro-
portion with the expected results. In his remarks he pointed out: 
 
                                                
23 Ibid. Fol. 176. 
24 According to Zwiedineck analyzes: “Despite that in general, the Franciscan missions have friendly 
attitude toward Austria-Hungary, it must be kept in consideration that the Italian propaganda has risen 
up among them in the last years. The Franciscans with Italian origin, despite they are grateful to the
imperial and royal government (k.u.k), are first of all loyal toward Italy. […] The Franciscans don’t 
have a good relation with the Albanian clerics. At the same time, they consider the Jesuits as rivals. 
The Bosnian Franciscans of Troshan beside being honest, support the patriotic ideals and despite the 
difficulties, they have managed to preserve among the s udents appointed to the them, the loyalty to-
ward the Monarchy.” Ibid. Fol. 177 b. 
25 According to the analyzes of the baron: “…the Jesuits deal exclusively with the novices, so in prin-
ciple they are distant toward any political activity; his is the reason why they don’t try to instigae 
among the students the sympathy toward Austria-Hungary. They consider as help for their religious 
mission the support from the k.u.k. government, andthey strictly forbid their (imperial) representa-
tives to interfere in their program.” HHStA, PA I, K 473, Fol. 176 b. 




“…if we want positive results and to continue to support economically the Catholic 
institutions in Albania to use them for our political action in the future, we must do 
some reforms that will secure us a greater influence over the clerics and their edu-
cation system. It’s not about opening new routes of action, but using with effectivity 
all the resources, in favor of the political and religious activity in Albania.”27 
 
Besides controlling directly the clerical educational and political agenda, the speaker 
suggested that this measure must go hand in hand with other instruments. The first one was 
that of finding, energetic and loyal figures in the positions of the bishops and archbishops, 
who had the intelligence, stability and full understanding of the current situation of the Al-
banian Catholic Church.28 The Albanian and foreign clerics stationed there had shown little 
promise, so Zwiedineck proposed bringing candidates from Dalmatia, Istria and South Ti-
rol.29 
Secondly, it was suggested to further indoctrinate the Albanian students in the religious 
institutions. According to him: 
 
“ [...] for the last 10 years the Albanians had studied with the Jesuits under the ex-
penses of the Austro-Hungarian state, […]  but after finishing their studies and vow-
ing as priests, they show little gratitude and loyalt  toward the cause. It is urgent 
that before vowing, these clerics must be sent to an Austrian or Hungarian seminar 
for further formation, where they will be indoctrinated in the interest of the Empire, 
and prepared as they should for their future obligation as priests.”30 
 
This period of indoctrination would serve two purposes: firstly would lead the students 
to abandon or forget the foreign enemy agendas, and secondly familiarize the candidates 
with the political action of the Danube Monarchy. 
Regarding the schools, it was vital to increase in quality and in number the available 
buildings and the staff, possibly bringing educators from the Monarchy, especially in the 
mountainous and rural areas. The clerics beside the religious duties toward their flocks of 
believers, had to do educational works and use curricula translated from the empire. More 
emphasis had to be shown toward the educational institutions for women.31 
Regarding the material texts, especially newspapers in Albanian, it was thought primar-
ily to use a publishing house in Vienna. But due to complications and the possibility of 
alienating different actors it was thought the usage of existing ones, especially the Albanian 
pamphlets and newspapers of the diaspora such as Bucharest and Borgo Erizzo near Zadar 
in Croatia. Unfortunately, the high illiteracy (around 99.5%) and the lack of a standardized 
                                                
27 Ibid. Fol. 178. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. Fol. 178 b. 
30 Ibid. Fol. 178. 
31 According to Zwiedineck: “the role of the Albanian woman was ambivalent; in society, she had 
little socio-political relevance, but in the close courters of the house she was vital for the survival of 
the family.” Ibid. 
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language, diverted this idea toward printing pamphlets and writing articles by influential 
intellectual Albanians.32 
On the economic prospect the monarchy viewed, that a number of incentives must be 
brought forward in order to encourage the Albanian tr ders toward her own ports and trade 
hubs. Primarily the intellectual contacts would rise among the Albanians the desire to trade 
in the ports of Trieste and Venice. Later on, a number of financial incentives and privileges 
like lower trading tariffs and permission facilities, would had been allowed toward Alba-
nian traders.33 
The last part of the memorandum discussed the reorganization of the consulates in Al-
bania. The participants agreed that the number of diplomatic centers was low and had pre-
viously operated without major success. Therefore, new missions had to be opened and the 
existing ones had to be reorganized, while keeping a  eye to the quality of the future dip-
lomats. It was essential to introduce the Albanian language in the K.u.K. Academy of East-
ern Studies. This action was considered fundamental, so that the future consuls would eas-
ily interact with the local population and familiarize with the area, its cultural customs and 
problems.34 
The 3rd secret meeting in Ballhausplatz on 23rd of December 1896, was briefer than the 
previous two, and the majority of the debates revolved on the matter of the Memorandum 
composed by Zwiedineck and Schmucker.35 A number of additional propositions were 
made by the participants related generally with the increase on the number of clerics and 
nuns from the empire, and also into the new sets of requirements for the potential new can-
didate consuls. Nonetheless the new proposition remained solely optional, and the meeting 
was concluded with the signature of the acts from all the participants.36 
Gemeinsame Ministerrat (GMR) meeting of 1916 
On 7th of January 1916, it was organized the meeting of the Councils of Ministers for the 
Commons Affairs (Gemeinsame Ministerrat), commonly labelled as GMR.37 After the 
Ausgleich of 1867, the GMR served as a forum where the different power and policy mak-
ers gathered in order to propose and implement common solutions for the problems of the 
Empire, under the supervision of the Emperor. But generally, they were led by the Common 
Foreign Minister, who due to his constitutional positi n was considered and had taken, the 
role of Chancellor in the absence of the Monarch.38 
The following actors participated in the conference: as Chairman the Joint Foreign Min-
ister István Burián, Austrian Prime Minister Karl Stürgkh, Hungarian Prime Minister István 
Tisza, Joint Finance Minister Ernest Koerber, Joint Minister of War Alexander von Kro-
                                                
32 Ibid. Fol. 179 b. 
33 Ibid. Fol. 180. 
34 The suggested offices of the Ballhausplatz proposed in Mitrovica, Tetovo, Prishtinë and Gjiro-
kastër, after many debates were taken out of the proposal with the consideration as outside the viable 
reach of the action plan. Ibid. Fol. 181 b and 182. 
35 Ibid. Fol. 140. 
36 Ibid. 
37 HHStA, KA KK Vorträge 6-1916, K.Zl. 526 




batin, Chief of the General Staff Conrad Hötzendorf and as secretary for the meeting Lega-
tion Councilor Alexander Hoyos.39 
The opening statement was made by the Foreign Minister Burián, who pointed out that 
the primary goal of the conference was to secure a responsible and brilliant administration 
of the latest military victories. Nonetheless, he urged the participants to be calm and ra-
tional in their positions, advices and especially not to be partial. They had to take into con-
sideration the interests of the whole Monarchy, andnot one-sided goals. The positions had 
to be formulated upon legal and constitutional elements, and how to implement them with 
the current financial and military conditions. It was vital to agree toward a unanimous War 
Aim Policy40, especially from the cooperation between the army command and the political 
branch. According to him: 
 
“At today’s conference, an attempt must be made to get an idea of how far the war 
goals can already be determined. The decisions resulting from such a determination 
could only be conditional, because their implementation naturally depends on the fi-
nal success of the war. When making decisions, one must also consider future ef-
fects. Any solution could be won in a successful war by the power of arms, but in 
peace such violent solutions are often politically very harmful and put a heavy bur-
den on the living conditions of a state.”41 
 
After initially discussing the Serbian problem, he proposed his idea regarding Albania. 
In his view: 
 
“it is absolutely necessary that the created independence of Albania is preserved, 
which is quite possible if to the country are given back those Albanian areas, that 
were lost to Serbia and Montenegro after the start of the Balkan wars. One should 
not be misled by the failure of the first attempt to establish an independent Albania. 
As a people, the Albanians had always expressed their will to live with the greatest 
tenacity and had also implemented it. The fact thateir nationality, despite national 
fragmentation and the greatest arbitrariness in all traditional folk peculiarities has 
been preserved, shows the ability of the Albanians to live nationally.”42 
 
Burián argued that according to the London Treaty of 1913, the country was not viable 
by itself (stand on its own two feet)43. The reason was the implementation of unsuitable 
methods, only applicable to the European culture styl  states, in an area that had been ruled 
nominally for the last four centuries by an anemic Ottoman administration. The Treaty of 
1913 had introduced international controlled institutions and by doing so, bypassing and 
                                                
39 Komjáthy, Protokolle…, 352‒3. 
40 The War Aims were a set of military and political objectives for Austria-Hungary, sanctioned from 
the GMR meeting of 19/06/1914, after her entry into war. Due to the fluid nature of warfare, the 
Monarchy had to constantly to renew these objectives and the GMR meetings served as a medium for 
these discussions between the military and the executiv  branch. 
41 Ibid. K. Zl. 526. 
42 Komjáthy, Protokolle, 358. 
43 Ibid. 
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alienating customary based political organizations. A econd reason for the initial failure of 
the Albanian experience was the rivalry with Italy. Despite an arranged political common 
agenda with the Italians, they had pursued from the beginning, an antagonizing approach 
toward the Austro-Hungarians interest in Albania. 
The third argument of Burián analyzes for the failure of the Albanian State was appoint-
ing a weak monarch, such as Prince Wied. His inexperience on the Albanian matter, had 
created the space for political fermentation between rivaling inner and outer forces in the 
country. Possibly with a better ruler, the chances for success would be higher. He 
commented: 
 
“We would have to do this work by exercising an effective protectorate over Alba-
nia, not with the intention of appropriating this country, but with the desire to set it 
up on our own feet and to prevent any interference by third countries.”44 
 
Later on, Burián draw a parallel between the Russian protectorate over Bulgaria and the 
future Austro-Hungarian protectorate over Albania. If the primary role for the support from 
the Russian diplomacy to the Bulgarian’s national aspir tion was to use them as tool for fur-
ther territorial aggrandizement toward the Ottoman Straits, the Albanian case was different: 
 
“the establishment and consolidation of the independence of a state, that serves its 
own life interests in accordance with our interests in the Balkans and must follow 
the conservative and purely defensive policies of the Central powers. Our policies in 
Albania could help us secure definite supremacy in the Balkans without falling into 
Russia’s mistakes and using the country as a tool for any desire to expand.”45 
 
Further on Minister Burián argued its policy regarding the southern Albanian territories, 
namely by exchanging them for a political support with Greece. This proposition would fa-
vor the Albanians in two aspect: firstly, the lost territories would be compensated with 
enlargement into the Serbian and Montenegrin areas, and secondly this would lead the 
country toward a more peaceful and less conflictual relationship with the Greece46. On the 
Greek position, this acquisition would mean controlling areas that were already subjected to 
Greek language and culture. Beside a territorial gain, this would had been a political card 
for those Greek politicians, who viewed the Central Powers as potential allies and wanted 
to preserve the neutrality of the country despite the interference of Entente. 
Regarding Bulgaria, the minister had difficulties to accept a further expansion of the 
ally in the region, with a possibility to reach the Adriatic Shores. Despite the cordial rela-
tions, it was advised to stop any further Bulgarian fl g waving outside the concorded areas 
of the agreements between the Central Powers. The reasons for this denial were of geo-
strategic and practical logic: 
 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Burián stated: “The neighborhood with Greece also offers advantages to the Albanians, which 
means that they would be less isolated and a closer political relationship between the two countries 




“they [the Bulgarian politicians] are aware of the fact that Bulgaria will have 
enough difficult tasks to do in the near future, if Macedonia and the eastern part of 
Serbia will be assimilated. Bulgaria has access [ports] to the Aegean and Black 
Seas, which is sufficient for its economic development. If we let the Bulgarians to 
penetrate Albania, we would lose the advantages that we expect of an independent 
Albania for the monarchy.”47 
 
The Italian adversary most probably wouldn’t cease to pose a threat for the Monarchy in 
the Albanian areas, as much the Russians didn’t stop after the failure in Bulgaria. If the 
risks would had been higher, the minister proposed an exit strategy, meaning a division of 
the country: 
 
“In any case, it was worth the effort to try the Albanian autonomy under Austro-
Hungarian protectorate. If it failed, nothing would be lost and we could still resort 
to other means, although it would be cheaper to carry out the division with Greece 
alone […]  Northern Albania [in itself] would not be of benefit to the monarchy, [so] 
we would have to organize and administer the country i  a completely different way, 
in order to make it equal to the other areas of the monarchy.”48 
 
The next speaker was the Hungarian Prime Minister Itván Tisza, who generally agreed 
with the view of Burián. Mainly, this support stemmed from the wish of the Hungarian 
side, to prevent more territorial gains toward Serbia, meaning a further incorporation of 1.5 
million Serbians into the monarchy. A bigger Albani with the added territories and the 
support of Germany for a reduced Serbian state, were s en as the most rational and interest-
ing proposition for the Hungarian politician. But nonetheless, Prime Minister Tisza doubted 
a possible transformation of Albania into a modern state. Due to internal struggle and the 
gold poured into Albania from the enemies of the Monarchy, the proposed idea of the For-
eign Minister was an expensive and dangerous project. If this proposition would had failed 
as in the case of rule of Prince Wied, the Austro-Hungarian image would be shattered dip-
lomatically. Under this analyzes, he opened the door f r both options, but leaned for the 
idea of Minister Burián due to national Hungarian interests.49 
The Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh was sceptic andinitially linked the binding deci-
sions regarding the fate of the country, with the peace negotiations after the war. In his 
view, securing a military foothold in the area, would had been of vital importance for the 
Monarchy on the short-term period. After this point, he saw the direct protectorate as the 
only viable choice. The Joint Finance and War Minister, had more or less no clear answer 
to this problem, mainly, advocating prudency over two primary conditions: the ability of 
the Monarchy to absorb new ethnic groups (what legal bases), and the ability to conduct 
long-term policies of such magnitude in a time of war.50 
The last speaker was Chief of the General Staff Conrad. His reflections were proposed 
in two forms: orally in the GMR, and by official note sent to each one of the members, 
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prior to the meeting, on 4th of January 1916.51 Differently from the opinion of the other 
members of the GMR, he sought that the decisions would have a binding characteristic due 
to the nature and the danger that the military forces would had to be exposed, in order to 
implement them. Only this way would Austria-Hungary have a road map, upon which to 
build a long-term policy that could be protected militarily. He proposed that all the states-
men present, would agree unanimously. Regarding Albania he had the following argu-
ments: 
Firstly, he saw the ambiguous term protectorate as problematic, due to the fact that this 
type of political entities were a constant source of friction, difficulties and crises for the 
protector, in political and material terms. This situation would had been magnified to a 
greater extent, if applied to the Botched Balkan States. According to him: 
 
“The primitive cultural, economic, complicated, never calming internal political 
situations of the sovereign Balkan states, would impose on us only political and cul-
tural difficulties that cannot be foreseen; the overcoming of which, is only possible 
through the full incorporation [of them] into the monarchy.”52 
 
Further on, he argued that the protected or stubborn states, were an easy prey by the in-
fluence of rivaling states. Additionally, it existed the danger that the protected could em-
power and clash in the future with its protector, such as the case of Bulgaria. The artifi-
cially, internationally protected and failed Albani, along with her one-day monarchy, was 
the par excellence case why he objected on principal to the idea of Burián. 
Secondly, he believed that an Independent Albania was not viable. In case of a protec-
torate advocated by Burián and a sponsored smaller Serbia by Tisza and the Germans, the 
Austro-Hungarian control over the area would have be n de facto only in paper. For this 
reason, he argued a full annexation for all the thr e botched Balkan states.53 The new mon-
archy southern border would had been mediated with the Greek counterpart, but generally 
he saw as most advantageous following the traditional division line between the Gegë and 
the Toskë.54 Any other solution was considered by him as reductio ad absurdum to the rea-
sons why the Monarchy entered into the war. 
The meeting continued with debates on the viability of the Albanian protectorate be-
tween Foreign Minister Burián and the Chief of General Staff Conrad. Despite the argu-
ments from both sides, no decisive decision was taken over this matter after the closure of 
the GMR of 7th of January 1916. Both lines of thought were pursued on the terrain, while 
maintaining a rather strange half military and half civil administered protectorate, in the 
conquered areas of the Albania in 1916‒ 918. 
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Support or a never changing imperial policy? 
The two sets of conferences showed above were willingly written without an extensive ana-
lyzes, in order to show to the reader in details, how the political thought in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire manifested. One may argue why the two different contextual confer-
ences were putted into confrontation and above all, with two decades of differences be-
tween them. The answer lies in the unique role that Austria-Hungary appointed on herself, 
and her supposed Civilizing Mission55 toward the Albanian problem. The conferences were 
the only two cases where the Albanian question was discussed extensively into the main 
halls of power in Vienna. Before that and in between them, separate talks of minor impor-
tance were done, but no clear position was manifested.56 
Another unique aspect was the time when they were organized, closely related with a 
rather calm and culminant moment of power for the Danube Monarchy in the Balkan. In 
late 1896, the empire had a rather secure foothold in the political Raum in the peninsula, 
established by the peaceful cooperation with the Ottoman Empire in order to maintain the 
status quo. The Serbian kings were still under the golden economical leash, and the Bos-
nian territories were being absorbed through the colonialist policies of Kállay. The triple 
Alliance with the German and Russian empire was secure, while the Italians were still at 
bay from crossing the eastern shores of the Adriatic. In early 1916, the imperial double ea-
gle flag was waving over the capital of Belgrade and Cetinje was soon to fall. With the help 
of the German and Bulgarian armies led by General Mackensen, the Macedonian theater of 
war was pacified. In the west the Adriatic Sea was soon to be balanced by the taking of 
Lovcen Hights and the Albanian territories, meanwhile the Russian, Italian and French 
front had no major breakthrough, but yet remained calm.57 
With these two unique traits the imperial power actors posed their view on solving the 
Albanian problem in their favor and, above all by themselves. In no other context had the 
Monarchy such an ample possibility to manifest her position and imperial power, with such 
extensive territorial decisions. Some authors, mainly Albanians and Serbians argue that 
Austria-Hungary had a decisive position after the Independence of the country in 1912, es-
pecially by the mediation of Count Berchtold to start a new war, unless the country was not 
cleared by the Balkan Armies. But this view is mainly i correct, due to the fact that Aus-
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tria-Hungary (unwillingly) along with other Great Powers molded an anemic and interna-
tionalized state, in a territory of continuous war, social and political upheaval.58 
Taking into account these two unique traits, what is striking is the unchanging policy of 
the empire toward the Albanian territories, mainly that of a future imperial protectorate 
(which due to her internal and external situations can easily relegate to a colony or newly 
annexed territories). The country was generally viewed with big internal divisions (linguis-
tic, religious and regional) toppled by a superiority complex toward the uncivilized tribes. 
With a rather illusional view, the diplomats posed the solution of protectorate in the first 
phase and later on annexation in the context of a second Bosnia. Nonetheless in the frame 
of this wrong view, it’s visible the first difference between the two sets of conferences, 
mainly the position and tool on how to implement this policy. 
The conference of 1896 saw the usage of the faith as a political medium for imperial 
expansion, initially thought pacifically.59 Via the pretext of the Kultusprotektorat, the cler-
ics and Catholic institutions would be used to spread the proposed political agenda, through 
national teachings of the Albanian language and mass indoctrination. The church would be 
the “militant agent” of the Empire for the Albanians60, seeding the political views via the 
language teachings. 
The conference of early January 1916 desired to imple ent the same policy by the force 
of arms. The military occupation would serve as pretext, and s a normalization phase, 
where the native political actors would be assessed into friendly and non-friendly to the 
empire, and acquire from them the decisional power.61 Both these instruments, as shown 
from the historical path that the Austro-Hungarian politicians and diplomats took, would 
fail on the long run. Surprisingly, the Empire chose to implement her imperial policies with 
a new method unknown before, even though existing methods of colonialization had proven 
more efficient. The French style of colonialization – Assimilation62 and the British one – 
Basutoland63, were shunned by the modus operandi of the Ballhausplatz officials and AOK 
(Armeeoberkommando) generals. The imperials either didn’t share power or made serious 
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efforts to eliminate other native actors from the Albanian playground.64 This led to a situa-
tion, where the Austro-Hungarian approach was seen as unreliable and double faced by the 
Albanian notables65 and the tribesmen of the north.66 The Italians on the contrary with little 
effort and expenses, made great progress to infiltrate and almost control vast economical 
areas such as the Maritime transport67, oil industry and the salt mines in Kavaja and Dur-
res.68 
The next element of similitude in the approach of the Empire toward the Albanian prob-
lem was the policy of drawing maps. The Austro-Hungarian diplomacy and AOK had liter-
ally little information on the outset of the geographical and ethnographical background of 
the western part of the peninsula. Partially, due to the fear of the Ottomans from espionage 
activities of enemy forces, and partially from the xenophobic attitude of the population to-
ward any foreign elements, the data was poor. The first revelations were made between the 
years 1867-1870, with triangular measurements on the northern coasts of the area. The data 
was later enriched with topography information about the mountainous areas in the north by 
using photogrammetry methods and only in 1912-1914 the joint War Ministry commis-
sioned the first maps of the Balkan area in general.69 On the demographic elements and 
economic ones, there was a lack of information and misreporting of the numbers either 
from the official Ottoman documentation70 or from the Austro-Hungarian diplomats.71 
Despite these two missing important components, the imperial policy was not with-
drawn from the original idea of reshaping the area with new borders and states. In the first 
set of conferences in 1896, the proposed territory of the Albanian nation (soon to be an in-
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dependent principality) was thought to be molded on the lines of the four Albanian vilayets. 
The political agenda had to be implemented as lengthily as possible, where the demographic 
element was numerically in favor of the Albanians. Some areas like Mitrovica, Tetovo, 
Prishtina and Gjirokastër (up to the Shkumbini river line, where the Greek influence was 
thought dominant) were excluded. The nucleus of the new principality would had been the 
northern area, where the Catholic tribes were under the direct protection of the Monarchy. 
The GMR in 1916 saw the same approach toward map drawing, but in this moment two 
groups antagonized, due to political and ethnical struggles inside the empire. The approach 
of Burián was that of a Maximalist Albania, where the new country would reach not only 
the old Kosovo vilayet territories, it would enlarge by compressing additional lands from 
Montenegro. Regarding the south, the Monarchy had always seen with doubt the position of 
the Southerner orthodox Albanians, mainly by viewing them as unreliable and possible be-
trayers in case of influence by third party powers.72 For this reason their incorporation to 
the Hellenic Kingdom up to the Shkumbini River, was seen as the most rational option. On 
the other side, Conrad Hötzendorf wished an Annexed Albania inside the monarchy. Any 
sacrifice made by the imperial troops, could only be justified with territorial benefits for the 
Monarchy.73 In his view, as far as the imperial armies would had had the possibility to 
march and defend militarily, the most plausible southern new border for the Monarchy 
would had been the Mati river line.74 
The next similitude was the geostrategical importance that these territories had for the 
Monarchy. Almost naturally after the unification of Germany and Italy, the position of the 
Danubian Empire had to be redirected toward new areas where the chance for further ag-
grandizement was available. The only possible source for further expansion was seen in the 
European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the role of the Albanian speak-
ing territories become detrimental for the policy makers in Austria-Hungary. 
According to the conferences of 1896, an enlarged Albania possibly as far as the border 
of Bosnia, would be of triple importance for the Monarchy. On a strategical level, the new 
Principality would pose two advantages to the monarchy: on the short-term it would serve 
as wedge between Serbia and Montenegro, stopping any future military action against the 
monarchy and vice-versa, and also in order to prevent any future union between the two 
south Slavic states. On the long-run, the existence of this new state would prevent any pos-
sible influence and advancement of other Great Powers (r spectively Italy and Russian 
Empire) to access and control the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea. Additionally, Austria-
Hungary would have used the southern borders as a negotiating asset only with Greece, and 
no other state. 
In 1916 the importance of Albania for the Empire grw exponentially, mainly due to her 
inability to monopolize the Balkan Area as her primary colonized backyard. Over the last 
three decades since the Congress of Berlin, Germany h d pierced economic deals with the 
Balkan states via multiple separate agreement.75 Additionally, among the ruling class of the 
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royal Balkan families, the Germanic bloodline had come to power into Greece,76 Bulgaria,77 
Rumania78 and later on in Albania.79 The general attitude in Vienna had been that of a cau-
tious relationship with an ally that constantly had pushed his own position in favor of the 
idea of Mitteleuropa, meaning a broader control over the Central and South-East European 
affairs. In early 1916 and afterwards, the Germans pushed Austria-Hungary for a political 
dialog with Serbia, in order to win a peace treaty. From it, a smaller Serbian and ruling family 
(possibly unified with Montenegro) would had risen with a potential new German ruler.80 
These plans were discussed in numerous occasions with the Hungarian Prime minister Ist-
ván Tisza, who endorsed this idea in order to lower th  number of Slavs in his country.81 
The Bulgarians on the other hand had constantly shown an increasing appetite for new 
territories, especially with the renewed attitude to reach the Adriatic shores and control the 
port city of Durrës in central Albania, like the Medi val King Simeon I had done in 896. 
Despite an agreement that led to the alliance with the Central Powers, the Bulgarian forces 
had stretched even further the concorded line Prishtinë–Gjakovë–Prizren, and running south 
of the Albanian-Macedonian borders of 1912. For multiple months under the excuse of 
military discordance in the chain of command, the Bulgarians had entered in central Alba-
nia and controlled the city of Elbasan. From there, rumors that the son of Tsar Ferdinand, 
Prince Kyril, was chosen as the new royal head of the country, were spread via Albanian 
agents.82 
In this situation in early 1916 the role of the Albanian territories was magnified in the 
eyes of the policy makers of the Monarchy. If in the previous decades the country had 
served as a deterrent for the southern Slavic states, nd a barrier for the Italians, in 1916 the 
most imminent danger was posed by the ambitions of the allies. Not only the territories had 
to be protected from the traditional Italic and Slavic enemies, but now the Germans and 
Bulgarians had entered in the bargain table beside Greece. In this prospect, Burián policy 
viewed the Maximalist Albania as the best proposition, in order to expel and stop further 
requests in the area, by holding the monopoly of influe ce as a protector. On the other side, 
Conrad envisioned the Annexed Albania s the only pragmatic choice, where under no legal 
term, any bargaining proposition could be made by the allies or enemies in the peace nego-
tiations in the end of the war. 
The last element of similitude between the two setsof conferences is the imperial ideo-
logical contradiction. After the failed anarchist movements all over Europe, later on fol-
lowed by the Unification of Germany and Italy, a new political movement had spread all 
over the continent. Like a rising fever, the unitarian feeling based on ethno-linguistic ele-
ments had turned into a political mantra for the majority of the leading states. Based on the 
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position of the Monarchy, and its multi-ethnicity, his pan-European aspiration was seen as 
dangerous and had to be stopped.83 The empire made of 11 different ethnicities, counting 
around 52 million inhabitants on the eve of World War I, had a German ethnic rule on the 
Cisleithanian side and Hungarian ethnic dominance on the Transleithanian half.84 Together 
these two groups had silenced violently any alternative nationalistic view, proposed by the 
rest of their compatriots.85 
Nonetheless, regarding the Albanian question, the imperial policy-makers pushed for 
the promotion, consolidation and strengthening of the Albanian nation. This fundamental 
contradiction stood like the sword of Damocles on tp of the heads of MdÄ and AOK, pos-
ing constant debate on how to implement it. In thisprospect the contradiction was eased by 
two characteristics: the premature phase of the national self-awareness among the Albani-
ans and the possibility to use it against other ethnicities as a political and military weapon 
(inimicus inimici mei amicus meus est). In the meetings of 1896, the primary objective was 
the creation of the avalanche effect in nationalistic terms, where the Albanians would have 
been used as an external force. Pushing naturally toward the “hated Slavs”, they would had 
secured a constant shield and spear effect on both sides (Slavic and Italian influence) due to 
their peculiar ethnolinguistic characteristics. 
In 1916 GMR, the conditions remained immovable regading this matter. The only 
change was the opening of a second possibility by the propositions of Conrad, meaning the 
usage of Albanian nationalism as an internal force. This course of action would had coun-
tered the rise in numbers of the Slavic population after the annexation of Montenegro and 
Serbia. In this prospect the Albanians would had been promoted,86 guided with paternal 
support87 and enjoyed the imperial peace, after many years of war: 
 
“So they still tell [the Albanians], with a kind of melancholy of the time when the 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers had been in the country and [...] in the middle of the 
bloodiest war had forced a two and a half year old Bessa [alb. Oath]. And they suc-
ceeded in doing, something that all the pashas of the Grand Lords of Istanbul and 
their warriors had not been able to do in five centuries, [...] was the most impressive 
thing of all the works of peace among our soldiers among the wild mountain peo-
ple.” 88 
 
As a final remark, one of the main questions of this analysis still hangs in the air, mean-
ing was Austria-Hungary invested into the Albanian state-building process, as much as the 
nation-building one? The question is unclear not only from these conferences, but also from 
the whole activity of the imperials in the Albanian question. Posing the Herderian line of 
thought, the nation-building process was a necessity and prerequisite for the latter evolution 
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toward the State-building process. The imperials on b th cases, never diverted their focus 
from the main issue, the creation of a nation molded under their image. Even though artifi-
cially and inconsistently advocated, the Foreign Miistry saw as a stepping stone the reali-
zation of the Albanian nation for the sake of the Empire geo-political position, more than a 
humanitarian case in 1896. The latter GMR meeting of 1916 added the Albanian question 
as an appendix (but rather a major one) to the issue of Serbia. The participants had all 
moved from the initial position of 1896, meaning that the Albanian nation was accepted as 
fait accompli. The continuous rebellions pushed and hushed from the Danubian diplomats 
against the Sublime Porte, the unification of the alph bet (fourteen existing ones in usage) 
under the continuous suggestion and rather skillful ntervention of consul Kral in 1908; the 
independence after many mediations in border dispute  s emming from Istria up to Arta 
Bay in 1912-1913; had created among foes and allies th  generally accepted perception, 
that the Albanian nation existed and Austria-Hungary was its defender. 
After this initial and crucial phase was completed, the future of the Albanian state re-
mained a commodity question, based on the wrong assumption that the imperials had to op-
erate in a perfect environment without external andinternal pressure. The question of the 
Albanian state dwindled between existence or a full and slow annexation, where in both 
cases it was under an imperial protectorate. In this regard the terms imperial or colonial 
protectorate have no major differences, since the outcome would had been the same. In 
1896 after the successful closure of the nation-building process, if we analyze the life and 
experiences of the participants, we can see that this outcome would had been the most 
desired one. Zwiedineck89 had served in Beirut, Constantinople, Syria and Bucharest. 
Baum90 had been posted in Izmir, Thessaloniki, Beirut, etc., while Schmucker91 had trav-
elled and served half a world between Shkodër, Odessa, Ioannina, Shanghai, etc. The Head 
of the Orient section Horowitz92 also had his fair share of obligations abroad in Bucharest, 
Alexandria, Constantinople and Bosnia; while Kállay ong life experience in Bosnia was 
well known. All the mentioned people, beside Baum, had been educated in the Oriental 
Academy. They had learned about the Orient and served for the empire as consuls and dip-
lomats, in places where colonialism and the imperialist c aspirations were the main line of 
thought and the generally accepted modus operandi. In this regard is safe to assume that, 
after the successful closure of the Albanian nation-building process, they would had been 
more open to a colonizing policy under the term protectorate, than with the formation of an 
independent state. 
In 1916 beside Burián and the undecisive Tisza, the rest of the participants who were 
members of the War Party, had no vivid interest to protect the Albanian state as a political 
entity. The foreign minister had posed a second option, based on pragmatic reasoning for 
the safeguarding of the empire. This meant less intervention militarily, economically and 
above all with a cautious eye over the future relations with the Albanians. Antagonizing 
openly another ethnicity, while the empire had open wounds from 11 national groups at 
home, would had been a destructive political myopia. In addition, his professional years as 
a diplomat in Greece, Germany, Russia, Bulgaria and in Bosnia, had taught him that it was 
                                                
89 Deusch, Die effektiven Konsuln, 714‒5. 
90 Ibid. 197. 
91 Ibid. 586‒7. 
92 Ibid. 349‒350. 
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too dangerous to operate with open colonial policies in the region. Above all reasons, the 
Monarchy was too weak and too divided to implement such actions unilaterally and openly. 
In this regard, the preservation of the Albanian state (loudly advocated by Thallóczy),93 was 
more an extra option thrown in the table of the imperial policy-makers by the astute Burián, 
than a desired and real possibility.94 
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Austria-Hungary and the Albanian Project. A Comparative Case Study: Between support 
and imperialism 
The purpose of this paper, is to analyze the role of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the 
creation of Albania as a geopolitical entity and it’s continuity up until the end of World 
War I. This process is investigated by comparing two pivotal moments, that link the 
Danubian Monarchy and the Albanian nation and state-building processes, especially the 
conferences of 1896 by the officials of the Ballhausplatz and the conferences of the 
Common Ministeral Council (GMR) in January 1916. 
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The paper is organized in three parts. The first one will introduce the shifting position of 
Austria-Hungary on the Eastern Question, regarding the methods and policies to be intro-
duced via the local diplomatic Attaché in different consulates around the Albanian speaking 
vilayets. Additionally, it will highlight their role on moulding the Albanian latent national-
ism into a political nation-building tool. The second part will investigate the Danubian 
Monarchy policy in the context of World War I and the controversial debates of the main 
imperial actors on the Albanian matter. The third part will compare the two above men-
tioned conferences and the shifting policies between colonization, imperial protectorate and 
independence. 
The importance of this paper is manifold. Primarily, t addresses the role of the Dual 
Monarchy in the creation of the Albanian state. Secondly, it points out the pragmatic rea-
sons why the Dual Monarchy had to pursue these policies. Thirdly, it points out the diver-
sity of opinions suggested by different imperial actors, which spanned from direct annexa-
tion, partial independence and partition of Albanian territories for geopolitical benefits. 
Fourthly, it’s a comparative study that has not been done regarding the two conferences, 
either from the Albanian or Austrian authors. 
 
